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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
DIGGS v. STATE: A NOT-SO-PLAIN ERROR?
MAGGIE T. GRACE*
In Diggs v. State,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals examined the
impact of judicial conduct on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.2 Specifically, the court utilized plain error review when defense counsel
failed to object to the judge’s behavior and held that the judge’s egregious conduct precluded the defendants from having fair and impartial trials.3 In expanding the scope of plain error review, the court
should have used the doctrine’s historical application to create narrow precedent,4 but instead took a policy-driven approach that left
vague guidelines for the future.5 To restore public confidence and
judicial integrity, the court could have instead used its inherent supervisory power to review the judge’s conduct6 or relied on assistance
from the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities.7
I.

THE CASE

Steven Diggs and Damon Ramsey were both convicted before the
same judge in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in separate trials
for different crimes.8 Diggs was arrested and found guilty of possession of marijuana.9 In a different incident, Damon Ramsey was
Copyright  2010 by Maggie T. Grace.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maryland School of Law. Thanks are owed to
John Parker Sweeney, J.D., and Benjamin Levin for helpful comments and feedback, to
The Honorable Judge Andre Davis for guidance during brainstorming, and to Rachel Witriol and Lindsay Goldberg for assistance throughout the editing process. Thanks are also
owed to Professor David Gray for his mentorship and to my family for their support and
encouragement.
1. 409 Md. 260, 973 A.2d 796 (2009).
2. Id. at 262–63, 973 A.2d at 797–98.
3. Id. at 293–95, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
4. See infra Part IV.A.1.
5. See infra Part IV.A.2.
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.
8. Diggs, 409 Md. at 263–64, 271, 973 A.2d at 797–98, 802.
9. Id. at 263–64, 973 A.2d at 798. On February 6, 2007, a jury found Diggs guilty of
driving without a license, but the judge declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to
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charged and convicted of possession of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin.10
Diggs and Ramsey both appealed their convictions to the Court of
Special Appeals, arguing that the judge’s behavior in each case prevented them from having fair and impartial trials.11
Specifically, Diggs argued that the judge—not the prosecutor—
laid the foundation for the distribution of marijuana charge by specifically questioning the detective who pulled over Diggs’s vehicle and
discovered the marijuana.12 Diggs also claimed that the judge intervened during the direct examination of another detective and attempted to rehabilitate him.13 Further, Diggs argued that the judge
pressed his first witness, Diggs’s sister, during direct and cross-examination for further details about the incident.14 During this particular
alleged error, defense counsel properly objected to the judge’s “inquisitory” statement and suggested that his conduct was inappropriate, but Diggs did not object at any other point.15
Ramsey similarly made claims of judicial bias.16 First, Ramsey alleged that the judge acted partially when he empanelled the jury
before holding a suppression hearing regarding Ramsey’s motion that
the drugs were illegally seized, contrary to the procedure established
in the Maryland Rules of Criminal Causes.17 The judge, he claimed,
reach a verdict on the charges of possession of marijuana and possession with intent to
distribute. Id. at 264 n.3, 973 A.2d at 798 n.3. On June 1, 2007, a different jury tried the
drug charges involved in this appeal. Id. at 264, 973 A.2d at 798. The jury found Diggs
guilty of possession of marijuana, but was unable to render a unanimous decision on the
charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id.
10. Id. at 271, 973 A.2d at 802.
11. Id. at 263 & n.1, 973 A.2d at 798 & n.1.
12. Id. at 264, 973 A.2d at 798. When the prosecutor failed to further question the
witness regarding the contents of recovered baggies, the judge asked specifically why the
drugs would be used for “street level distribution” rather than “personal use.” Id. Diggs
alleged that the judge’s questioning—not the prosecutor’s—established why the marijuana
would be used for street distribution, laying the charge for distribution of marijuana (instead of solely possession). See id. at 264–65, 973 A.2d at 798–99 (showing how the judge’s
questioning might have laid the foundation for the charge).
13. Id. at 265, 973 A.2d at 799. The judge allegedly tried to rehabilitate the officer by
saying, “‘It was over two and a half years ago, right? I mean we’re talking November and
the event would have been September ’04 so okay.’” Id.
14. Id. at 265–66, 973 A.2d at 799. The judge purportedly asked about issues such as
how long her brother had been staying at her house, id. at 266–67, 973 A.2d at 799–800,
whether she was “‘comfortable’” about information she had provided, id. at 267, 973 A.2d
at 800, and why she failed to inform the officers immediately that the drugs and money
belonged to her boyfriend and not to her brother, id. at 268–69, 973 A.2d at 800–01.
15. Id. at 269–71, 973 A.2d at 801–02.
16. See id. at 271, 973 A.2d at 802.
17. Id. at 271–72, 973 A.2d at 802–03. The defendant alleged that empanelling the
jury before ruling on the motion showed the judge’s partiality from the outset of proceed-
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then accused defense counsel of striking jurors based on race18 and
referred to defense counsel’s hearing strategy as “‘pretty silly.’”19
Ramsey also maintained that the judge elicited important elements of
the State’s case by intervening during the direct examination of the
State’s key witness, expanded the scope of the prosecutor’s inquiry,
and strengthened the evidence surrounding the element of intent to
distribute when the prosecutor had finished direct questioning.20
Ramsey claimed that the judge’s intervention of sua sponte questions
and comments to jurors during the witness’s cross-examination undermined defense counsel’s attempt to impeach recollections about the
incident.21 Moreover, Ramsey argued that the judge asked another
witness to retake the stand, after the prosecutor declined to engage in
redirect, and proceeded to establish the drugs’ chain of custody.22 Finally, Ramsey asserted that the judge’s addition to the pattern jury
instructions governing credibility violated his right to a fair trial.23
Before any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative to hear
both cases and to decide whether Diggs’s and Ramsey’s due process
rights to a fair trial were violated by the judge’s conduct.24
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Diggs v. State represents the intersection of two key legal issues:
(1) the application of plain error review as an exception to the preservation requirement,25 and (2) due process concerns involving the
standards of judicial conduct.26
ings because under Maryland Rule 4-252, the motion to suppress the seized contraband is
to be determined before trial. MD. R. 4-252(a), (g)(1); Diggs, 409 Md. at 271–72, 973 A.2d
at 802–03.
18. Diggs, 409 Md. at 272–74, 973 A.2d at 803–04.
19. Id. at 275, 973 A.2d at 804. The judge also later referred to defense counsel as
“‘young lady,’” which Ramsey argued demeaned her status as a lawyer. Id. at 280, 973 A.2d
at 807.
20. Id. at 275–78, 973 A.2d at 804–06.
21. Id. at 278, 973 A.2d at 806.
22. Id. at 280, 973 A.2d at 807.
23. Id. at 281–83, 973 A.2d at 808–09.
24. Id. at 262–63, 973 A.2d at 797–98. Because this same judge’s behavior was at issue
in Green v. State, the court in Green vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
and remanded for reconsideration following the Diggs decision. 409 Md. 302, 302, 973
A.2d 820, 820 (2009).
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
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A. Plain Error Review Developed as an Exception to the Preservation
Rule—Which Requires Counsel to Object to Preserve an Issue
for Appeal—and as a Means to Protect a Defendant’s
Due Process Rights
Maryland courts historically require counsel to preserve issues for
appeal, but sometimes exercise appellate review in limited circumstances to vindicate a defendant’s due process rights.27 When formal
bills of exception were required,28 counsel had to introduce a motion
for a mistrial or a motion to strike the judge’s remarks and to warn the
jury to disregard those remarks in order to preserve appellate review
of challenges to the judge’s comments.29 Eventually, the rule was informalized and parties were no longer required to take formal exceptions during the course of a trial, so long as the objection was made
known to the court.30 Courts recognized exceptions to the preservation rule only when the record “clearly showed that the accused had
not had a fair and impartial trial, and thereby was denied due process
of law”31 under either “structural”32 or “plain error” review.33
27. Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 8–9, 209 A.2d 776, 780–81 (1965). The Court of Appeals
has also recently elaborated on its “inherent supervisory authority over the administration
of justice in Maryland courts” in a case dealing with judicial conduct. Archer v. State, 383
Md. 329, 360, 859 A.2d 210, 229 (2004); see also Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 259,
466 A.2d 1301, 1304 (1983) (noting that the Court of Appeals has the ability to exercise
supervisory authority). But see State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 606 n.3, 870 A.2d 196, 211 n.3
(2005) (noting that the first time the Maryland Court of Appeals ever exercised its supervisory authority was in Archer). See generally Smith v. Andrews, 959 A.2d 597, 610 (Conn.
2008) (suggesting that the exercise of supervisory authority is a very rare occurrence);
Sapper v. Sapper, 951 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (same).
28. Originally, an attorney properly preserved issues with a formal exception to be included in a bill of exceptions, which became part of the record, upon receiving an unfavorable trial court ruling. Derrick Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation
of Error Requirement in Criminal Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 947, 949 (1998). The purpose of
the formal exception was to document errors when there was no court reporter or transcript to “recite the occurrences at trial.” Id. In their discretion, trial judges preserved a
record of these exceptions, compiling a bill of exceptions to list the errors subject to appeal. Id.
29. Elmer, 239 Md. at 8, 209 A.2d at 780.
30. See id. at 8–9, 209 A.2d at 780–81 (explaining that the change in the rule was meant
to simplify procedures and to rid the court of unnecessary formalities). For a more detailed and complete analysis of the purposes behind the preservation of error requirement,
see Carter, supra note 28, at 949–54.
31. Elmer, 239 Md. at 8, 209 A.2d at 780.
32. See, e.g., Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 303, 768 A.2d 656, 659 (2001) (arguing that
structural error review is proper under Maryland law to vindicate prejudicial issues). Structural error review is appropriate where “the framework within which the trial proceeds” is
affected. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). Automatic reversal is warranted, in this instance, because the error unfairly affected the entire trial, and thus the
lower court proceedings could not have “‘reliably serve[d] its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence.’” Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78

R
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Plain error review allows Maryland appellate courts to review issues not properly preserved during trial proceedings when a defendant’s due process rights have been infringed.34 Under Maryland
Rule 8-131(a), the scope of appellate review is limited to issues
“plainly appear[ing] by the record to have been raised in or decided
by the trial court.”35 The Rule, however, grants the appellate court
the discretion to “rarely”36 decide issues not preserved.37 Plain error
(1986)). For example, in Tumey v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Ohio practice of only paying a mayor for his services as a judge if he convicted those
brought before him was unconstitutional. See 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (noting that the
judge had a “direct pecuniary interest in the outcome” and an “official motive to convict
and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village”); id. at 512 (observing
that the judge had a “personal financial interest” and “was operating the court in order to
make money for the village”). Specifically, the Court ruled that the defendant was denied
his due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have an “impartial judge,”
“[n]o matter what the evidence was against him,” because of the mayor’s pecuniary interests in the case at hand. Id. at 535.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has noted that structural error is subject to automatic
reversal when errors are of “constitutional magnitude,” including where a judge is partial.
Redman, 363 Md. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5. The court has recognized the Tumey
decision and the application of structural error analysis. Id. The doctrine, however, has
enjoyed a limited application before the Court of Appeals, arising in cases like Harris v.
State, in which the court held that where the jury was not sworn in there was no waiver of
the defendant’s objection to the unsworn jury. 406 Md. 115, 122, 956 A.2d 204, 208
(2008); see id. at 122–27, 956 A.2d at 208–11 (reasoning that the “presumption of regularity” normally given to trial proceedings was overcome because the jury was never sworn in,
and a sworn jury is a necessity, not just a mere formality); cf. Alston v. State, 177 Md. App.
1, 16 n.6, 934 A.2d 949, 958 n.6 (2007) (noting that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
has applied structural error analysis several times), cert. granted, 403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d 1104
(2008).
33. See Brown v. State, 203 Md. 126, 129–30, 100 A.2d 7, 9 (1953) (refusing to exercise
appellate review because no objections were made and there was no showing of plain error
sufficient to justify reversal). In Robinson v. State, handed down after Diggs, the court clarified more fully the circumstances in which plain error review is appropriate. 410 Md. 91,
104–06, 976 A.2d 1072, 1080–81 (2009). Exercising the court’s discretion must not unfairly prejudice the parties or court and must assist in the orderly administration of justice.
Id. at 104–05, 976 A.2d 1080. For a more detailed explanation of the necessary circumstances for exercising appellate review, see id. at 104–06, 976 A.2d 1080–81.
34. See, e.g., Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 134–35, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020 (1977) (noting
the use of plain error review in “compelling circumstances” such as error in jury
instructions).
35. MD. R. 8-131(a); see also Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995)
(stating that “ordinarily [the appellate court] will not review an issue that was not
presented to the trial court”); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 188–89, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994)
(holding that an appellate court will not ordinarily consider an issue not previously raised
and that the Court of Appeals may exercise its discretion independently of the Court of
Special Appeals).
36. Robinson, 410 Md. at 104, 976 A.2d at 1079 (“Such prerogative to review an unpreserved claim of error, however, is to be rarely exercised and only when doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule.”); see id. at 105, 976 A.2d at 1080
(refusing to exercise plain error review because appellant did not attempt to argue that
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appellate review of jury instructions is explicitly recognized in Maryland Rule of Criminal Causes 4-325(e), but no other rule expressly
identifies the court’s discretionary review of issues not properly preserved.38 Plain error review was originally exercised rigidly,39 but as
the importance of due process rights increased in the context of instructional errors, the doctrine enjoyed a more liberal application.40
1. The Maryland Courts Originally Emphasized Procedural Concerns
to Use Plain Error Review Infrequently Under a
“Correctability” Approach
Maryland originally utilized a rigid “correctability” approach to
plain error review, allowing appellate review only when, even if the
error had been objected to, the court could not have corrected it.41
In Wolfe v. State,42 for example, the trial court attempted to assist the
defendant in making a decision about whether he should testify or
remain silent, warning that the State had a strong case against him if
he did not testify.43 Even though the defendant failed to object to the
failure to object was “mere oversight” instead of the “deliberate decision of defense counsel not to object”).
37. Bell, 334 Md. at 188, 638 A.2d at 113.
38. MD. R. 4-325(e). The Rule states the following:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating
distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.
Upon request of any party, the court shall receive objections out of the hearing of
the jury. An appellate court, on its own initiative or on the suggestion of a party,
may however take cognizance of any plain error in the instructions, material to
the rights of the defendant, despite a failure to object.
Id.
Maryland Rule of Criminal Causes 4-323(a), governing objections to evidence, does
not explicitly state the same, but its predecessor was recognized as affording an exception
to the preservation rule where the accused was deprived due process of law. MD. R. 4323(a); Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 9, 209 A.2d 776, 781 (1965) (noting that under thenRule 522 formal exceptions are unnecessary so long as the party makes the objection
known to the court). But see Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 149–50, 729 A.2d 910, 919
(1999) (refusing to “relax the preservation requirement” of 4-323(a) even though a few
earlier death penalty cases had suggested the appropriateness of such plain error review
because “[t]he rules for preservation of issues have a salutary purpose of preventing unfairness and requiring that all issues be raised in and decided by the trial court, and these rules
must be followed in all cases including capital cases”).
39. See infra Part II.A.1.
40. See infra Part II.A.2.
41. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 219 Md. 319, 324–25, 149 A.2d 774, 777 (1959) (noting
that plain error review will not be exercised when “the errors complained of are such that
the trial court could have—and undoubtedly would have—corrected [them] if the defendant had interposed her objections”).
42. 218 Md. 449, 146 A.2d 856 (1958).
43. Id. at 454–55, 146 A.2d at 858–59.
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alleged error, the appellate court took cognizance of and corrected
the plain error by awarding the defendant a new trial because “the
error . . . was such as the court could not have corrected even if it had
attempted to do so.”44 It was not improper for the trial court to inform the defendant about testifying, the court decided, but the
judge’s comments about the evidence—without instructing the jury to
disregard them—could have prejudiced the defendant.45
Maryland courts applied plain error review under this approach
narrowly to protect procedural fairness concerns.46 For instance, in
Reynolds v. State,47 the defendant was convicted of three separate offenses that concerned prostitution48 and alleged on appeal that the
court did not clearly explain the meaning of “disorderly house” in the
jury instructions.49 The court, however, declined to use the doctrine
because “it [was] obvious that the errors . . . [in jury instructions we]re
such that the trial court could have—and undoubtedly would have—
corrected [them] if the defendant had interposed her objections.”50
Therefore, counsel could not appeal the use of or failure to explain
the meaning of “disorderly house.”51 This “correctability” methodology respected the fairness concerns underlying the preservation rule,
while also leaving appropriate room for correcting particularly egregious errors.52
2. Maryland Courts Focused on the Defendant’s Due Process Rights
to Enlarge Plain Error Review of Jury Instructions
Maryland courts replaced the aforementioned procedural policy
concerns with constitutional due process considerations in plain error
44. Id. at 455, 146 A.2d at 859.
45. Id. at 454–55, 146 A.2d at 858–59.
46. See, e.g., Reynolds, 219 Md. at 324–25, 149 A.2d at 777 (refusing to exercise plain
error review because the court could have corrected the error if counsel had objected).
But cf. Agee v. Lofton, 287 F.2d 709, 709–10 (8th Cir. 1961) (observing that counsel might
not object because he fears irritating the judge); People v. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d 531, 533
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (same).
47. 219 Md. 319, 149 A.2d 774.
48. Id. at 321, 149 A.2d at 775.
49. Id. at 324, 149 A.2d at 777.
50. Id. at 324–25, 149 A.2d at 777.
51. Id.
52. See Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 468, 918 A.2d 506, 511 (2007) (suggesting that
plain error review should be exercised rarely “so that (1) a proper record can be made with
respect to the challenge, and (2) the other parties and the trial judge are given an opportunity to consider and respond to the challenge”).
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review of jury instructions;53 the courts, however, continued to temper
the analysis with some degree of stringency.54 The new approach justified the use of plain error review not only where the trial court could
have corrected the error, but also in “compelling” or “exceptional”
circumstances, which encouraged a case-by-case analysis of instructional errors.55 Despite the lack of stringent guidelines to the analysis,
the court conducted inquiries into defense counsel’s trial tactics.56
For example, in Squire v. State,57 the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the failure to object to instructions on the standards of
self-defense resulted from counsel’s belief that jury instructions were
given in accordance with Maryland and federal law and that the failure was not a result of counsel’s oversight or calculated trial decisions.58 Therefore, plain error review could be used in this
circumstance.59 In Dimery v. State,60 the Court of Appeals ruled that
even constitutional rights could be waived and plain error review
would not “alleviat[e] . . . unfortunate consequences as may result
from a choice of trial tactics.”61 This concern for trial tactics tempered the relaxation of the doctrine, preventing the court from always
infringing on the judge’s discretion.62
The interest of the Court of Appeals in the defendant’s due process rights, however, justified an even broader view of the error’s materiality in State v. Hutchinson.63 In Hutchinson, the court’s interest in
the defendant’s right to a fair trial justified assessing the materiality of
53. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202–08, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037–41 (1980)
(analyzing plain error review and concluding that it may be used to ensure the defendant’s
right to a fair trial when erroneous jury instructions are involved).
54. See, e.g., Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 141–42, 355 A.2d 455, 458–59 (1976) (noting that “[o]rdinarily, of course, a question will not be considered on appeal if it has not
been presented to the trial court” and finding that no extraordinary circumstances existed
to justify appellate review).
55. Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 134–35, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020 (1977).
56. See, e.g., id. at 136, 368 A.2d at 1021 (awarding a new trial, despite failure to object,
after concluding that the failure was not a result of trial tactics or inadvertence); Sine v.
State, 40 Md. App. 628, 633–34, 394 A.2d 1206, 1210 (1978) (evaluating whether counsel’s
failure to object was for tactical reasons or a result of inadvertence).
57. 280 Md. 132, 368 A.2d 1019.
58. Id. at 136, 368 A.2d at 1021.
59. Id. at 135–36, 368 A.2d at 1020–21.
60. 274 Md. 661, 338 A.2d 56 (1975). The court relied on Maryland Rule 756 g, which
governed instructional errors. Id. at 665, 338 A.2d at 57–58.
61. Id. at 676–77, 338 A.2d at 63–64 (quoting Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 387, 183 A.2d
359, 367 (1962)).
62. Id. at 678–79, 338 A.2d at 64–65.
63. 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980). The court, here, relied on then-Rule 757(h),
which “clearly anticipates circumstances giving rise to error which may justify” review of
jury instructions. Id. at 202, 411 A.2d at 1037–38.
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the trial judge’s omission in the jury instructions that the defendant
could be found not guilty.64 The court affirmatively refused to adopt
the correctability interpretation of the governing rule.65 Rather, the
court concluded, it was more important that “an appellate court . . .
take cognizance of unobjected to error as compelling, extraordinary,
exceptional or fundamental to assure the defendant a fair trial.”66
The court held that because a “trial judge may influence the jury by
the inflection of his voice, his words, his conduct and his assessment of
the evidence,”67 his “omission in the [jury] instructions was an oversight material to the rights of the defendant and incapable of being
cured by the verdict sheet.”68 Hutchinson marked a significant development in the doctrine because the court held that an omission denied
a defendant his due process rights and legitimated appellate review to
correct that error.69
This relaxed approach for errors in jury instructions was extended to all alleged errors of law.70 In Rubin v. State,71 the Court of
Appeals followed the Hutchinson analysis in analyzing an error in jury
instructions,72 noting that “errors of law generally” could be taken
into consideration under this approach.73 The court held that no
64. See id. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1040–41.
65. Id. at 203, 411 A.2d at 1038. The dissent, in fact, accused the majority of sub silentio overruling the “correctability” standard. Id. at 218, 411 A.2d at 1046 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. at 203, 411 A.2d at 1038 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 206, 411 A.2d at 1040.
68. Id. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1041. But see Brown v. State, 14 Md. App. 415, 420–22, 287
A.2d 62, 64–65 (1972) (holding that a plain error would be reviewable if it were “an irremediable error of commission, but not an error of omission”).
69. See Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1041 (holding that the judge’s omission
from jury instructions was material to the defendant’s rights); see also State v. Daughton,
321 Md. 206, 210–13, 582 A.2d 521, 523–24 (1990) (considering whether the omission of a
jury instruction on presumption of innocence was plain error under the Hutchinson analysis); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 399, 478 A.2d 1143, 1149 (1984) (holding that the
omission of the defendant’s mental retardation from the jury instructions as grounds for
finding the defendant to be legally insane was not plain error), post-conviction relief granted,
321 Md. 248, 582 A.2d 794 (1990).
70. See, e.g., Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 587–88, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992) (“[A]s
[former] Rule 756 g makes clear with respect to jury instructions, and as the cases hold
with respect to errors of law generally, an appellate court may in its discretion in an exceptional case take cognizance of plain error even though the matter was not raised in the trial
court.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 141–42, 355 A.2d 455, 459 (1976))).
71. 325 Md. 552, 602 A.2d 677.
72. Id. at 587–89, 602 A.2d at 694–95.
73. Id. at 587–88, 602 A.2d at 694 (quoting Dempsey, 277 Md. at 141–42, 355 A.2d at
459). But see Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 326–27, 893 A.2d 1018, 1039–40 (2006)
(declining to exercise plain error review under Maryland Rule 4-323(a), which states that
“[a]n objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is
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“fixed formula” had been determined for when discretion should be
exercised, but “‘expect[ed] that the appellate court would review the
materiality of the error . . . giving due regard to whether the error was
purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the
result of bald inattention.’”74 The Rubin court refused to exercise
plain error review because it found that counsel might have failed to
object to the jury instructions for tactical reasons.75
B. An Impartial Judge Is an Integral Part of a Fair Trial
Maryland courts require the judge to remain impartial so that the
defendant receives his right to a fair trial and the public’s confidence
in the judiciary is subsequently maintained.76 Substantial precedent
has developed under Maryland law focusing on the amount of discretion a judge should have during trial proceedings to avoid interfering
with the defendant’s rights.77 Interested in preserving judicial integrity and promoting high standards of judicial conduct, the Maryland
legislature also created the Commission on Judicial Disabilities.78

offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent,” and that
“[o]therwise, the objection is waived” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Conyers v.
State, 354 Md. 132, 149–50, 729 A.2d 910, 919 (1999) (refusing to “relax the preservation
requirement” under Rule 4-323(a) even though a few earlier death penalty cases had suggested such plain error review would be appropriate because “[t]he rules for preservation
of issues have a salutary purpose of preventing unfairness and requiring that all issues be
raised in and decided by the trial court, and these rules must be followed in all cases
including capital cases”); Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 611, 616 A.2d 392, 400 (1992)
(“[D]espite the special character of a capital case, the tried and tested rules of evidence
and procedure still apply. Both sides should play by the rules.”); Gaylord v. State, 2 Md.
App. 571, 575, 235 A.2d 783, 786 (1967) (“[A] defendant in a criminal prosecution cannot
raise for the first time on appeal an objection which was available to him at the trial and
which he did not raise below.”).
74. Rubin, 325 Md. at 588, 602 A.2d at 694 (quoting Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 203, 411
A.2d at 1038).
75. Id. at 589, 602 A.2d at 695.
76. The comment to the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A states the following:
A judge must perform judicial duties fairly and impartially. A judge who
manifests bias of any kind in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding
and brings the judiciary into disrepute. Facial expression and body language, in
addition to oral communication, can give an appearance of judicial bias. A judge
must be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. For example, a judge must refrain from comment, gesture, or other conduct that could
reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment.
MD. R. 16-813 CJC Canon 3A cmt.
77. See infra Part II.B.1.
78. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4A; see infra Part II.B.2.
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Maryland Courts Developed Guidelines to Review Judicial Conduct
to Ensure that the Jury Is Not Influenced by the Judge

In evaluating the judge’s behavior, Maryland courts afford the
trial judge “wide discretion in the conduct of a trial and [hold] that
the exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been
clearly abused.”79 Under the totality of the circumstances, when a
judge exercises her discretion, she must actually remain unbiased,80
must appear impartial,81 and must avoid interacting with counsel in a
way that would prejudice the defendant in the jury’s eyes.82
a. The Judge Must Actually Be Impartial to Avoid Influencing the
Jury and Must Properly Exercise His Judicial Authority as
a Matter of Maryland Nonconstitutional Criminal
Procedure
The Court of Appeals has held that a judge must remain “impartial and courteous,” and not allow his “personal feelings” to be observed by the jury.83 A “clear showing” that the jury was adversely
influenced must be made to find that the appellant was prejudiced by
the judge’s behavior.84
In Bryant v. State,85 the Court of Appeals applied this “clear showing” analysis.86 The court held that a “clear showing” had not been
made because, while the judge rebuked defense counsel, “the mere
fact that the trial was conducted in an impatient and brusque way” did
not justify reversal.87 The court concluded that the judge’s comments
to the jury about “being kept away from their homes” and his admonitions to counsel did not clearly prejudice the jury.88
To determine actual bias, Maryland courts have examined the circumstances at trial and the judge’s words and actions.89 The court’s
inquiry in Marshall v. State,90 for example, centered on the judge’s ad79. Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451, 404 A.2d 244, 254 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 530, 273 A.2d 164, 177–78
(1971)).
80. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
81. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
82. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
83. Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 670, 59 A.2d 509, 513 (1948).
84. Id.
85. 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955).
86. Id. at 585, 115 A.2d at 511.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 583–85, 115 A.2d at 510–11.
89. See, e.g., Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 359, 859 A.2d 210, 228 (2004) (considering
the circumstances of the trial and the judge’s conduct and warnings to the defendant).
90. 291 Md. 205, 434 A.2d 555 (1981).
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monitions to the witness, which the court found had infringed on the
defendant’s rights.91 The court held that the admonitions “unnecessarily affected” the defendant’s remaining testimony and infringed on
his right to present a defense.92 The judge’s admonitions to the defendant about the consequences of not testifying risked compelling
him to testify in a certain way to satisfy the judge, “out of fear that if he
did not, he would suffer some severe, but unexplained
consequence.”93
Similarly, in Archer v. State,94 the court focused on the judge’s actions, which evidenced his departure from “neutral” judge to “advocate” in advising a recalcitrant witness that he could be subject to
cross-examination or refuse to testify and be subject to contempt proceedings.95 The Archer court held that the judge’s warnings and conduct compelled the witness’s testimony and that his instructions to a
colleague to try to convict the witness of contempt were prejudicial in
denying the defendant his right to a fair trial.96
The Archer court also concluded that “as a matter of Maryland
nonconstitutional criminal procedure, the trial judge’s improper use
of judicial authority compel[led]” reversal.97 In so holding, the court
exercised its “inherent supervisory authority over the administration
of justice,” in addition to basing its holding on the defendant’s due
process rights.98 The court relied on United States v. Hastings,99 in
which the Supreme Court asserted that the use of supervisory authority was necessary “to implement a remedy for violations of recognized
rights, to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests
on appropriate considerations validly before the jury, [and] to deter
illegal conduct.”100

91. Id. at 214, 434 A.2d at 560.
92. See id. (noting that “[p]erjury warnings may intimidate defense counsel as well as
the defendant himself, thereby discouraging counsel from eliciting essential testimony
from the witness”).
93. Id. at 212–13, 434 A.2d at 559.
94. 383 Md. 329, 859 A.2d 210.
95. Id. at 347, 859 A.2d at 221.
96. Id. at 347, 360, 859 A.2d at 221, 228–29.
97. Id. at 360, 859 A.2d at 229.
98. Id.
99. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
100. Archer, 383 Md. at 360, 859 A.2d at 229 (citing Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505).
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The Judge Must Also Appear Impartial to Avoid Influencing the
Jury Because the “Probability of Unfairness” Is Enough to
Deprive a Defendant of His Due Process Rights

Besides inquiring into the judge’s actual behavior, Maryland
courts have held that “even the probability of unfairness”101 must be
guarded against because the accused has a paramount right to a fair
trial.102 To guard against the appearance of unfairness, the courts
have used a “reasonable” person approach to review the judge’s influence on the jury.103
For instance, in Vandegrift v. State,104 the Court of Appeals held
that the trial judge’s questioning “was beyond the line of impartiality
over which a judge must not step” when he asked questions that could
lead a jury to infer that he did not believe the witness’s testimony.105
A judge can properly “sharpen” issues and “clarify” points for the
jury,106 courts have held, but proceeding further and manifesting disbelief infringes on the jury’s role as ultimate trier of fact107 and
thereby deprives the defendant of his right to a fair trial.108
Likewise, in Jefferson-El v. State109 the court focused on the need
for the appearance of impartiality, under the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, in ruling that the judge’s behavior could have influenced the jury.110 The court reasoned that the judge’s statements in
the defendant’s prior case—that the verdict was “‘an abomination’”—
could lead a reasonable person to question his partiality in this

101. Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 452, 404 A.2d 244, 254 (1979) (emphasis added by
the court) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955)).
102. Id. at 451–53, 404 A.2d at 254–55.
103. See, e.g., Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 109, 622 A.2d 737, 742 (1993) (holding
that a reasonable person could infer that the judge was not impartial).
104. 237 Md. 305, 206 A.2d 250 (1965).
105. Id. at 310–11, 206 A.2d at 253–54 (holding that the judge’s questions to the witness
“influenced the jury”).
106. Pearlstein v. State, 76 Md. App. 507, 515, 547 A.2d 645, 649 (1988).
107. Vandegrift, 237 Md. at 310, 206 A.2d at 253; see also Starr v. United States, 153 U.S.
614, 626 (1894) (“It is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial
judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest word or
intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.”).
108. See Jefferson-El, 330 Md. at 105–07, 622 A.2d at 740–41 (noting that the judge’s conduct has a “direct bearing” on the defendant’s fair trial).
109. 330 Md. 99, 622 A.2d 737.
110. Id. at 109–10, 112, 622 A.2d at 742, 743–44.
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case.111 Reversal would then be justified because a judge’s conduct,
opinions, or manifestations most likely impacted the jury.112
Using the same reasonableness analysis, in Jackson v. State,113 the
Court of Appeals emphasized the judge’s duty to remain impartial in
sentencing.114 Instead of focusing on whether the judge’s comments
during trial were motivated by ill-will or prejudice, the court focused
on whether justice “appear[ed] to [have] be[en] done.”115 Because
the judge’s language—such as referring to people who are “‘from the
city’” and the “‘ghetto’” as “‘rotten apples’”116—could make a reasonable person believe the judge was biased and that race was inappropriately considered at sentencing, the court ruled that the
defendant had been deprived of due process.117
c. The Judge Must Avoid Interacting with Counsel in a Way That
Improperly Influences the Jury
Recently, Maryland courts have also spotlighted the interactions
between judge and counsel.118 Because their interactions can influence the jury, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial may be
infringed.119 The Court of Appeals has held that where the defendant
has chosen to be tried by a jury, the jury—as ultimate trier of fact and
free from the prejudicial influence of interactions between judge and
counsel—should decide the accused’s guilt or innocence.120
In Johnson v. State,121 the Court of Appeals explored the relationship between judge and counsel and held that the judge abused his
111. Id. at 109, 622 A.2d at 742. The court relied on then-Maryland Rule 1232, Canon
3C of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, that required recusal when the judge’s impartiality might be questioned. Id. at 106, 622 A.2d at 741.
112. Id. at 106, 112, 622 A.2d at 741, 743–44.
113. 364 Md. 192, 772 A.2d 273 (2001).
114. Id. at 207, 772 A.2d at 281–82.
115. Id. at 205, 772 A.2d at 280 (“In the oft-quoted statement of Justice Frankfurter,
‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954))); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864
(1988) (noting that justice must appear to have been served); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242–43 (1980) (same); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (same).
116. Jackson, 364 Md. at 197, 772 A.2d at 275–76.
117. Id. at 208, 772 A.2d at 282.
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 388, 722 A.2d 873, 879 (1999) (considering
the interaction between judge and counsel and the influence it may have on the trial).
119. See id. at 393–94, 722 A.2d at 882 (noting that a judge’s comments, interrogations,
and premature rulings can influence the jury and violate a defendant’s “right to a fair
trial”).
120. See id. at 385–86, 722 A.2d at 878 (“In addition, if the defendant has elected to be
tried by a jury, it is the province of that jury to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (quoting Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 106, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993))).
121. 352 Md. 374, 722 A.2d 873.
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discretion and the defendant was precluded from having a fair trial
where the judge threatened defense counsel with arrest for contempt
of court before the jury.122 The court held that regardless of defense
counsel’s conduct, portraying him in such a “negative light” deprived
his client of a fair trial.123 The risk of influencing the jury was one the
court was not willing to take.124
2. The Maryland Legislature Created the Commission on Judicial
Disabilities to Maintain High Standards of Judicial Conduct
The Commission on Judicial Disabilities was established by constitutional amendment in 1966125 as a disciplinary body to “assist in
monitoring the conduct of Maryland judges.”126 The Commission has
the power to investigate complaints against judges of the Court of Appeals, intermediate courts of appeal, and circuit courts (among
others), and the Commission can also conduct hearings concerning
complaints, issue reprimands, and recommend further disciplinary action to the Court of Appeals.127 Action can be taken for sanctionable
conduct—including “misconduct while in office,” “persistent failure”
to perform judicial duties, and “conduct prejudicial to the proper ad-

122. Id. at 387, 393–94, 722 A.2d at 879, 882; see also Spencer v. State, 76 Md. App. 71,
78–79, 543 A.2d 851, 854–55 (1988) (finding reversible error where, under the totality of
the circumstances, the trial judge’s remarks to counsel in front of the jury “impugned her
integrity,” “indicated that she was dishonest with the court and the jury,” and denied appellant a fair trial).
123. Johnson, 352 Md. at 388, 722 A.2d at 879.
124. Id. at 388–89, 973 A.2d at 879–80; see also Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 339–40, 825
A.2d 1008, 1041 (2003) (“We must zealously guard against any actions or situations which would
raise the slightest suspicion that the jury in a criminal case had been influenced or tampered
with . . . .” (emphasis added by the court) (quoting State v. Wilson, 336 S.E.2d 76, 77 (N.C.
1985))).
125. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4A.
126. STATE OF MD., COMM’N ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/cjd/pdfs/annualreport09.pdf
[hereinafter Annual Report].
127. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(a)(1)–(2).
The Maryland Rules of Courts, Judges, and Attorneys give the Commission the authority to direct Investigative Counsel to initiate proceedings against the judge, who may then
dismiss the complaint or make a recommendation to a Board consisting of two judges, two
attorneys, and three public members. MD. R. 16-804.1(a), 16-805(a), (c), (f). The Board
then makes a recommendation to the Commission. MD. R. 16-805(j)(1).
During Fiscal Year 2009, the Commission received 137 complaints (only five were initiated by the Commission’s Investigative Counsel, while most were filed by the general public). Annual Report, supra note 126, at 7. The Commission issued six dismissals with a
warning and only one private reprimand that involved a district court judge. Id.

R
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ministration of justice”—that violates obligatory provisions128 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.129
After a recent investigation, for example, the Commission unanimously rejected the issuance of a public reprimand,130 and instead
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals with a recommendation
that the judge receive a thirty-working-day suspension.131 The Commission concluded that the judge’s “undignified, discourteous, and
disparaging” comments violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and
“str[uck] at the very heart of the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and the public’s confidence in such integrity and impartiality.”132 The judge’s disrespectful remarks during the course of
fourteen cases, including, “‘I don’t have any mercy,’”133 violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct and eroded public confidence in the
judiciary.134
Upon the Commission’s recommendation, the Court of Appeals
independently reviewed the judge’s behavior.135 The court found by
clear and convincing evidence136 that this judge’s inappropriate comments were “exhibited in a pattern of behavior over a period of time
and in many cases” and were “prejudicial to the administration of jus128. The Rules distinguish between binding and non-binding obligations. See MD. R. 16813 pmbl. (distinguishing between “‘shall’” and “‘shall not,’” which impose “binding obligation[s],” and “‘should’” and “‘should not,’” which are “intended as hortatory and as a
statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding obligation”).
129. MD. R. 16-803(k)(1).
130. In re Lamdin, CJD 2005-108 & CJD 2006-055, at 15 (Md. Comm’n Judicial Disabilities 2007), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/cjd/pdfs/cjd2006055.pdf, aff’d, 404
Md. 631, 948 A.2d 54 (2008). But see In re Boone, CJD 2007-047, Stipulation at 2 (Md.
Comm’n Judicial Disabilities 2007), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/cjd/pdfs/
cjd2007047.pdf (making a private reprimand public after finding that the judge’s “undignified and disparaging” comments were made on the record, in the courtroom, and “represent[ed] a serious lapse in judgment” in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 3A, 3B(4), and 6 of
the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct).
131. In re Lamdin, CJD 2005-108 & CJD 2006-055, at 17.
132. Id. at 14–15.
133. Id. at 5. The judge in another case said, “‘I told some lady we confiscate cell
phones and we put the cell phones in plastic bags and send them down to Annapolis. I
suggested maybe we ought to do the same thing with children except poke holes in the
bag.’” Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 14–15.
135. In re Lamdin, 404 Md. 631, 650, 948 A.2d 54, 65 (2008); see also In re Foster, 271 Md.
449, 470, 318 A.2d 523, 534 (1974) (“Based on our independent review of the record, we
think that the Commission’s finding in this regard was supported by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
136. In re Lamdin, 404 Md. at 637, 948 A.2d at 57 (“Upon our independent review, this
Court must determine whether the charges against the respondent are supported by clear
and convincing evidence and which, if any, Canons of the Code adopted by this Court have
been violated.”).
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tice, manifested bias . . . and lacked dignity, courtesy, and patience.”137 The court concluded that a thirty-working-day suspension
without pay was the appropriate sanction.138
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Diggs v. State,139 the Maryland Court of Appeals used a plain
error analysis, when both defendants’ attorneys failed to object to all
of the alleged errors, to reverse the convictions of the two defendants
because the judge’s behavior in each case was so egregious as to preclude a fair and impartial trial.140 Writing for the majority, Judge Battaglia examined the scope of a defendant’s right to a fair trial when
defense counsel fails to object to the judge’s inappropriate conduct
during trial.141
The court first examined whether defense counsel’s failure at
trial to object to most of the issues raised on appeal in both cases
precluded its review of the issues.142 The court reasoned that judicial
bias that had not been objected to was sometimes appealable under
structural error review.143 Structural error review, the court maintained, allowed the appellate court to review structural “defects” that
affected the framework of the trial proceedings,144 which could include an impartial judge.145 The court noted that it more often used
plain error review to review errors “‘so material to the rights of the
accused’” that they might preclude a fair and impartial trial, and utilized this approach to review the judge’s behavior in these cases.146
137. Id. at 650, 948 A.2d at 65.
138. Id. at 655, 948 A.2d at 68.
139. 409 Md. 260, 973 A.2d 796 (2009).
140. Id. at 294–95, 973 A.2d at 816.
141. Id. at 262, 284–87, 973 A.2d at 797, 809–11. The court overturned the convictions
despite defense counsels’ failure to object at the time some of the alleged errors took
place. Id. at 287, 973 A.2d at 811.
142. See id. at 284, 973 A.2d at 809 (addressing the preservation issue before deciding
the merits of the case). The court reasoned that both objections—Diggs’s counsel’s objection to the judge’s questioning of the first witness and Ramsey’s counsel’s objection to a
comment the judge made to the jury, which the judge did not rule on—would be reviewable on appeal. Id. at 284–85, 973 A.2d at 809–10.
143. Id. at 285–86, 973 A.2d at 810–11. The court also noted that it had previously
reviewed allegations of judicial bias without articulating a reason for requiring objections.
Id.
144. Id. at 285, 973 A.2d at 810 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Redman v.
State, 363 Md. 298, 303 n.5, 768 A.2d 656, 659 n.5 (2001)).
145. Id. (citing Redman, 363 Md. at 303 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5).
146. Id. at 286, 973 A.2d at 811 (quoting Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 397, 478 A.2d
1143, 1148 (1984)).
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The court next examined its judicial partiality jurisprudence and
concluded that a disinterested judge is fundamental to a defendant’s
right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.147 A criminal defendant is guaranteed
by due process the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” because otherwise the judge might impede on the jury’s role.148 Moreover, as a
matter of Maryland nonconstitutional criminal procedure, the court
reasoned, a trial judge cannot improperly use his “‘judicial authority’”
to deny the defendant his due process rights through admonitions
and partial conduct.149 Finally, the court noted, a judge must not only
actually be fair in questioning, but must appear impartial and
disinterested.150
Examining the need for judicial impartiality, the court concluded
that judges are held to high standards of conduct because of their
distinguished position and potential to impact the jury’s verdict.151
While a judge can appropriately comment or clarify answers, the court
ruled that a judge must maintain neutrality, question sparingly, and
allow attorneys to use cross-examination for clarification.152 The
court reasoned that a trial judge’s repeated challenges to a witness’s
statements had—in a previous trial—suggested disbelief in testimony
and improperly influenced the jury;153 a judge’s repeated questioning
could problematically result in the jury relying on the judge’s disbelief
147. Id. at 263 & n.2, 287–92, 973 A.2d at 798 & n.2, 811–14.
148. Id. at 288, 973 A.2d at 812 (citing North Carolina v. Rhodes, 224 S.E.2d 631, 638
(N.C. 1976)).
149. Id. at 287, 973 A.2d at 811. For example, the court noted that in a previous case
involving judicial partiality, three warnings of contempt, a phone call to another judge in
the witness’s presence, the threat of life imprisonment as a contempt sanction, the threat
that the other judge would impose the longest available contempt penalty, and the advice
given on how the witness could testify was “‘excessive and improper.’” Id. (quoting Archer
v. State, 383 Md. 329, 352, 859 A.2d 210, 224 (2004)).
150. Id. at 288–89, 973 A.2d at 812. The court stated that a judge’s comments at sentencing, which “could cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of the judge,”
were an example of abuse of discretion. Id. at 289, 973 A.2d at 812 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Archer, 383 Md. at 356–57, 859 A.2d at 227 (2004)).
151. Id. at 289, 973 A.2d at 812–13 (citing Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 106, 622
A.2d 737, 741 (1993)). Further, the court reasoned, if the defendant had “elected to be
tried by a jury,” the jury—not the judge—should determine his “guilt or innocence.” Id.
(quoting Jefferson-El, 330 Md. at 106, 622 A.2d at 741). For instance, where ill-will,
prejudice, or the appearance of racial bias could be inferred from a judge’s words at sentencing, a judge could have abused his discretion. See id. at 290, 973 A.2d at 813.
152. Id. at 292, 973 A.2d at 814. In a footnote, the court clarified and narrowed the
holding, declining to extend the analysis to a judge’s role in either a criminal or civil trial
with self-represented litigants. Id. at 292 n.11, 973 A.2d at 814 n.11.
153. Id. at 290–92, 973 A.2d at 813–14 (quoting Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 310,
206 A.2d 250, 253 (1965)).
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to assess a witness’s credibility.154 Further, the court noted that it had
previously held that even when the jury was not present in the courtroom, a trial judge’s admonitions to a witness about the consequences
of lying could constitute error by affecting the defendant’s own
honesty.155
The court then considered the cases sub judice and held that the
judge inappropriately intervened with questions and comments, exceeding the appropriate circumstances in which a judge may clarify
answers.156 During Diggs’s trial, the court found that the judge laid
the foundation for the distribution charge during the lead detective’s
questioning and rehabilitated another confused detective.157 The
judge also strengthened the State’s case, the court noted, by inappropriately questioning the defense’s lead witness and implying disbelief
in her testimony, creating an “aura of partiality in front of the jury.”158
Similarly, the court found that during Ramsey’s trial, the judge
helped draw key elements of the State’s case from a witness and elicited testimony of intent to distribute after the prosecutor had completed his examination of a witness.159 The judge also commented to
the jury in a way that bolstered the prosecutor’s integrity and established the drugs’ chain of custody when the prosecution failed to do
so.160
In conclusion, the court held that the judge’s behavior in these
cases was so egregious as to preclude the defendants from receiving
fair and impartial trials and warranted reversal, and the court remanded the cases for rehearing before a different judge.161 The court
further ruled that counsel’s repeated objections to the judge’s behavior could lead to unprofessional conduct from both the judge and
lawyer and could violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial by portray154. Id. at 291–92, 973 A.2d at 814.
155. Id. at 290, 973 A.2d at 813 (warning that such behavior risks “swimming in treacherous waters” because the judge’s interference could cause the witness to change his testimony (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 211, 434
A.2d 555, 558 (1981))).
156. See id. at 292, 973 A.2d at 814 (“These cases differ from the appropriate circumstances in which a judge may ask questions to clarify an answer or comment.”).
157. Id. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Relying on Maryland Rule 4-325(c), which states “[t]he court may . . . instruct
the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding,” the
court held that the language the judge added to the pattern jury instructions governing
credibility was appropriate under Rule 4-325 because it was not an inaccurate statement of
the law. Id. at 282, 283 n.7, 973 A.2d at 808, 809 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting MD. R. 4-325(c)).
161. Id. at 294–95, 973 A.2d at 816.
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ing counsel negatively to the jury.162 Ordinarily, however, the court
cautioned that failure to object would only be countenanced by the
appellate court where the judge “exhibit[ed] repeated and egregious
behavior of partiality, reflective of bias.”163
In dissent, Judge Murphy opined that neither Diggs nor Ramsey
was entitled to a new trial.164 He refused to apply a “‘repeated and
egregious behavior’” exception to the preservation rule, which requires counsel to object to preserve the issue for appeal.165 He further argued, particularly in Diggs’s case, that it was unclear whether
continuous objections would have been unprofessional.166
In Diggs’s trial, Judge Murphy maintained that the judge asked
only proper questions.167 Further, he asserted that Diggs’s counsel
did not inadequately represent her client, but rather failed to object
as a matter of trial tactics.168 Judge Murphy also believed that Ramsey
was treated with respect and was not precluded from having a fair
trial, as evidenced by the judge’s refusal to allow the State’s lead witness to give nonresponsive answers to defense counsel’s questions.169
162. Id. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
163. Id. The court further noted that failure to object in less persuasive situations would
not lead to intervention by the Court of Appeals because it is counsel’s responsibility to
preserve issues for appeal. Id., 973 A.2d at 816.
164. Id. at 295, 973 A.2d at 816 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 296, 973 A.2d at 817.
166. Id. at 296–97, 973 A.2d at 817.
167. See id. at 295–96, 973 A.2d at 816 (“I would not grant a new trial on the ground that
the Circuit Court asked questions that the prosecutor was clearly entitled to ask.”). Moreover, Judge Murphy maintained that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury to warn them
that his comments were only advisory—as opposed to binding—and that they should draw
no conclusions from them was evidence that he did not abuse his discretion. See id. at 296,
973 A.2d at 816–17 (“In my opinion, the fact that the jury ‘hung’ on the ‘possession with
intent to distribute’ charge reinforces the presumption that the jury followed those instructions.”). Judge Murphy thought that the jury’s inability to unanimously convict Diggs of
possession with intent to distribute supported his claim that the jury took the judge’s comments to heart and made a decision regardless of his commentary and questioning. Id.
168. Id. at 297–98, 973 A.2d at 817. Judge Murphy believed that the record showed that
defense counsel was not afraid to request relief or engage in exchanges with the trial court
during bench conferences. Id. at 297, 973 A.2d at 817. In addition, during closing argument defense counsel said the following:
The judge in this particular case was unable to treat those people equally on the
witness stand. . . . Every person is supposed to be treated the same by the Court
with the same dignity and respect. But it’s a perfect example that even though we
would like to believe that human beings don’t let their hatred cause them to do
wrong things, it does happen . . . . [A]nd you saw it here during this trial.
Id.
169. Id. at 298–99, 973 A.2d at 818. Judge Murphy also asserted that empanelling the
jury before the suppression hearing was done for efficiency purposes and that there was no
abuse of discretion during jury selection. Id. at 299, 973 A.2d at 818–19. Judge Murphy
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ANALYSIS

In Diggs v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals broadened the
use of plain error review to evaluate judicial conduct.170 The court
could have respected the defendants’ due process rights171 and left a
more narrow precedent under the older “correctability” approach to
plain error review.172 Instead, the court left vague guidelines for its
new “repeated and egregious behavior” exception to the preservation
rule173 by applying the plain error analysis that had largely evolved
under review of instructional errors.174 Alternatively, the court could
have avoided this problem, while also honoring the defendants’
rights, by exercising its inherent supervisory power to decide this exceptional case.175 The court also could have enlisted the help of the
Commission on Judicial Disabilities to promote the integrity of and
restore confidence in the judiciary.176
A. The Diggs Court Greatly Expanded Plain Error Review to Examine
the Judge’s Conduct and Left Vague Precedent for Applying the
New “Repeated and Egregious Behavior” Exception to the
Preservation Rule
Prior to Diggs, the Court of Appeals had not specifically addressed
the extent to which a trial judge’s “personal beliefs and opinion[s]”
and repeated conduct could constitute plain error.177 The court’s exconcluded that the comments to the jury were acceptable and the addition to the pattern
jury instructions was a proper clarification of the law. Id. at 300–01, 973 A.2d at 819.
170. Id. at 262–63, 287, 294–95, 973 A.2d at 797, 811, 816 (majority opinion).
171. The court did not reach the issue of the Sixth Amendment, but instead decided
that the judge’s behavior deprived the defendants of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 263 & n.2, 973 A.2d at 798 & n.2. See generally Emily Wheeler, Note, The
Constitutional Right to a Trial Before a Neutral Judge: Federalism Tips the Balance Against State
Habeas Petitioners, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 849 (1985) (noting that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to a trial by an impartial jury “has been interpreted to require nondiscrimination in juror selection and the protection of jury members from prejudicial ex parte influences” and has not been interpreted to mean a jury free from judicial influence (footnote
call number omitted)).
172. See infra Part IV.A.1.
173. Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
174. See infra Part IV.A.2.
175. See infra Part IV.B.1.
176. See infra Part IV.B.2.
177. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 12–13, Diggs, 409 Md. 260, 973 A.2d 796 (No. 110)
(“This Court has yet to address the question of whether a trial judge’s intrusion of its
personal beliefs and opinion into a criminal trial [constitutes] plain error.”); infra note
208. In his reply brief, Diggs noted that the court had not addressed this issue, but that in
Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 602 A.2d 677 (1992), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Rubin v.
Gee, 128 F. Supp. 2d 848 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 292 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2002), plain error
review was not limited to jury instruction errors during a criminal trial. Appellant’s Reply

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR305.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 22

28-MAY-10

DIGGS V. STATE

13:44

701

pansion of plain error review, which created the “repeated and egregious behavior” exception to the preservation rule,178 could have
found stronger grounding under the narrow “correctability” approach
to plain error review,179 but was rooted in more recent precedent
largely examining errors in jury instructions.180
1. The Diggs Court Should Have Reviewed the Errors Under the
Older “Correctability” Approach to Create a Narrow
“Repeated and Egregious Behavior” Exception to the
Preservation Rule
The “correctability” approach181 would have given the court a
structural crutch to rely on in establishing guidelines for future plain
error review in the context of judicial conduct, as opposed to instructional errors.182 The more narrow approach would have beneficially
confined the doctrine to particularly egregious cases, like this, and
avoided future appeals presenting less convincing facts.183 Further,
because the “correctability” approach was used for all errors of law,
the court would have been justified in relying on it, instead of the
more recent and relaxed instructional error approach.184
Under this standard, the court could have reached the same result because the circuit court “could not have corrected [the error]
Brief, supra, at 12 (citing Rubin, 325 Md. at 587, 602 A.2d at 694); see also Dempsey v. State,
277 Md. 134, 141–42, 355 A.2d 455, 459 (1976) (“However, as [former] Rule 756 g makes
clear with respect to jury instructions, and as the cases hold with respect to errors of law
generally, an appellate court may . . . take cognizance of plain error even though the
matter was not raised [below].”).
178. Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
179. See infra Part IV.A.1.
180. See infra Part IV.A.2.
181. See supra Part II.A.1.
182. Compare Diggs, 409 Md. at 286–87, 973 A.2d at 811 (using plain error review as the
doctrine had developed under review of instructional errors). See generally Note, Appellate
Review in Criminal Cases of Points Not Raised Below, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (1941) (suggesting that procedural rules and individual rights clash when the appellate court considers issues not raised below, but that where “[defendant] appears to be guilty, a conviction
will rarely be reversed” because of the pressure to punish the “wicked”).
183. The court tried to confine its approach by suggesting that ordinarily the failure to
object will not be corrected, but using this “correctability” approach would have better set
fortified, structural guidelines rather than appearing as a mere caution to counsel. See
Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16 (creating the “repeated and egregious behavior”
exception with the warning that the court will not ordinarily intervene when counsel has
failed to object).
184. See, e.g., Wolfe v. State, 218 Md. 449, 455, 146 A.2d 856, 859 (1958) (applying plain
error to a judge’s comments to a defendant during trial because the court could not have
corrected the error).
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even if it had attempted to do so.”185 Without counsels’ objections,
Diggs and Ramsey were prejudiced by the judge’s actual behavior and
appearance of partiality.186 But even if both attorneys had objected
every time, their clients would likely have been prejudiced in the eyes
of the jury through constant rebukes by the partial judge,187 whom the
jury looks to for guidance.188 Regardless of whether counsel objected,
the jury would have been influenced, the defendants’ rights would
have been offended, and the errors could not have been corrected
but for appellate review.189 Using the “correctability” approach would
have allowed the court to both correct the errors and establish a “repeated and egregious behavior” exception to the preservation rule190
with strict guidelines for future appellate review when objections
would be futile and would interfere with the jury’s task.191
A futility requirement would legitimize the failure to object at
every instance of judicial misconduct because repeated objections
would not change the judge’s behavior and could lead to unprofes-

185. Id.; see also Diggs, 409 Md. at 283, 973 A.2d at 809 (“Although Diggs’[s] and Ramsey’s attorney only objected once to the pattern of judicial behavior, both argue, nevertheless, that it would have been futile or unprofessional to continuously object, and that we
should reach their arguments in order to serve the ends of justice.”).
186. See Wheeler, supra note 171, at 871 (“Precisely because of the acknowledged influence that a judge has over a jury, the opponents of judicial comment fear that anything
other than judicial passivity will jeopardize the impartiality of the verdict.” (footnote call
number omitted)).
187. See, e.g., Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998) (holding that because early in
the case Oade’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the court’s “attitude,” and the judge
“interrupted counsel and denied the motion,” “it was not unreasonable for Oade’s counsel
to remain quiet during the remainder of the trial rather than voice objections and risk
antagonizing the judge” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. See Johnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 385–86, 722 A.2d 873, 878 (1999) (suggesting
that a judge’s conduct has influence on the jury’s verdict).
189. Cf. Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 339–40, 825 A.2d 1008, 1041 (2003) (“We must
zealously guard against any actions . . . which would raise the slightest suspicion that the jury in a
criminal case had been [improperly] influenced . . . . Any lesser degree of vigilance would foster
suspicion and distrust and risk erosion of . . . confidence in the integrity of our jury system.” (emphasis added by the court) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Wilson, 336
S.E.2d 76, 77 (N.C. 1985))).
190. Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 816.
191. Of course, counsel should still object to the judge’s conduct, but under this approach, objecting once would preserve the objection to the judge’s behavior throughout
the trial instead of requiring an objection at every instance of misconduct. Cf. STEVEN P.
GROSSMAN, TRYING THE CASE 141–47 (1999) (suggesting that one of counsel’s most difficult
decisions is when to object because such objections could be damaging to a client). Objecting once, instead of not at all, would establish the error on the record and give the
defendant the chance to receive a fair trial by avoiding biasing the jury.
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sionalism.192 In Diggs’s case, for instance, it was futile to repeatedly
object to the judge’s constant improper conduct; counsel had objected once during the judge’s questioning of a lead witness,193 but
the judge’s behavior, here, appears to have been typical.194 Not only
was the judge’s behavior a constant problem in both of these cases,
spanning the entire trial proceedings,195 but his behavior also resulted
in the Court of Appeals vacating another case he had heard in the
past.196 Moreover, his behavior across trials evidenced a pattern of
judicial misconduct.197 Objection to every error was not likely going
to change his behavior in any significant way.198 As evidence of his
attitude, the judge specifically told Ramsey’s attorney that “[y]ou can
say anything that you want at this bench,” when counsel attempted to
object.199 His statements and actions showed a disregard for his neutral role, likely eliminating the possibility of preventing this type of
behavior with objections.
Not only would repeated objections have been futile, but they
likely would have influenced the jury.200 Because “[n]egative interac192. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 293–94, 973 A.2d at 815–16 (noting that appellants argued
that repeated objections would have been futile and ruling that repeated objections could
lead to “unprofessional conduct” and “exacerbate tension”).
193. Id. at 269–71, 973 A.2d at 801–02. The following occurred after counsel objected:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] This is inappropriate. You are not supposed to involve
yourself in a case this way.
THE COURT: Do you understand my comment? You can say anything that you
want at this bench.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] No, Judge, if you’re going to say in front of the jury that
it was two and half years before you mentioned that, then I want them to hear,
but this isn’t the first time. We have been doing this case many times before.
Id. at 270, 793 A.2d at 802.
194. See, e.g., id. at 264, 973 A.2d at 798 (noting Diggs’s first allegation that the judge
helped lay the foundation for the distribution of marijuana charge); see also infra note 299
(noting recent appeals that have arisen involving the same judge’s conduct).
195. See supra notes 12–23 and accompanying text (detailing the judge’s behavior in
both Diggs’s and Ramsey’s trials); see also Diggs, 409 Md. at 271–82, 973 A.2d at 802–09
(noting that the judge intervened in multiple testimonies and made comments to jurors
during Ramsey’s trial).
196. Green v. State, 409 Md. 302, 302, 973 A.2d 820, 820 (2009).
197. See infra note 299 (exploring how the judge’s conduct might not have been confined to this pair of cases, but was an overarching issue).
198. Upon counsel’s exception to the judge’s addition to the pattern jury instructions,
the judge noted that he “d[id] it in every case,” Diggs, 409 Md. at 281, 973 A.2d at 808
(emphasis omitted), suggesting that an objection would not result in a change in his behavior here.
199. Id. at 270, 973 A.2d at 802.
200. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 177, at 17 n.8 (arguing that repeated objections
might leave counsel “with considerable suspicion and skepticism by the very group whom
he is trying to convert to his client’s view of the facts, thereby perhaps irreparably damaging his client’s interest” (quoting People v. Sprinkle, 189 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ill. 1963))).

R
R

R
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tions” between the judge and counsel throughout the trial could “lead
to unprofessional conduct” and “exacerbate tension in the courtroom,”201 counsel was justified in not objecting to avoid prejudicing
his client.202 The judge’s constant behavior would have required
many objections throughout trial and interfered with the jury’s independent review of the case.203 Using this justification for extending
plain error review under the older “correctability” approach, however,
would have highlighted the prejudicial effect of objections in this particular case.204 The alternative framework would have factored in the
exceptional egregiousness, here, to allow a truly narrow future “repeated and egregious exception”205 to the preservation rule.206
2. The Diggs Court Used the Plain Error Analysis that Developed
Largely Under Review of Instructional Errors to Leave Vague
Precedent and Failed to Redeem Its Analysis
By focusing on the prejudicial effect of the judge’s conduct, the
court largely grounded its analysis in recent precedent that expanded
the scope of plain error review of jury instructions.207 Applying the
201. Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815.
202. Other courts have recognized why counsel might be reluctant to object to a judge’s
inappropriate behavior. See, e.g., Agee v. Lofton, 287 F.2d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1961) (reasoning that attorneys fear antagonizing the judge and prejudicing their client); People v. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (noting that counsel might fail to object to a
judge’s interrogation of a witness because he would want to avoid angering the judge).
Some commentators stress the importance of objecting to prejudicial conduct. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 111 (3d ed. 1999) (advising that
“[t]rial counsel’s most difficult task is preserving for appellate review a claim of prejudicial
error because of the conduct of the trial judge” and that counsel “must respectfully state
for the record whatever prejudicial tone of voice, facial expressions and/or gestures that
you observe being used by the trial judge”); id. § 201(A) (“When the judge’s question will
prejudice your client, you must object to preserve error.”).
203. See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 968 (1998) (noting that the jury
must make its decision free from the influence of others).
204. The court, instead, attempted to narrow its holding under the more relaxed approach by placing a warning to lawyers in the last two paragraphs of its lengthy opinion.
See Diggs, 409 Md. at 294–95, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
205. Id. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
206. A “correctability” standard would minimize future appeals and only allow intervention in the most egregious cases like Diggs, instead of giving counsel room to argue in less
convincing cases. See generally Appellant’s Brief at 18, Stuckey v. State, No. 1202 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. June 29, 2009) (citing Diggs and using the case as precedent to argue that,
despite counsel’s failure to object, appellate review should be taken of the trial judge’s
partiality in questioning because counsel’s failure to object may be explained by his hesitancy to increase courtroom tensions).
207. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 286–87, 973 A.2d at 811 (citing Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223,
235–36, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993), Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 587–88, 602 A.2d 677, 694
(1992), State v. Daughton, 321 Md. 206, 211–12, 582 A.2d 521, 523–24 (1990), Trimble v.
State, 300 Md. 387, 397, 478 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1984), and State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198,

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR305.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 26

28-MAY-10

DIGGS V. STATE

13:44

705

doctrine in the context of judicial misconduct,208 especially in this
problematic pair of cases,209 the court established a vague “repeated
and egregious behavior” exception to the preservation rule, which will
be difficult to apply practically in the future.210 The court could have
redeemed the analysis—and set a stricter standard—by distinguishing
trial tactics, but failed to avail itself of that opportunity.211
a. The Diggs Court’s Concern for the Defendants’ Due Process
Rights Motivated a Results-Driven Analysis to Mirror
Plain Error Review of Jury Instructions
Expanding the analysis specifically to judicial bias mirrored the
extension of the plain error doctrine for instructional errors in State v.
Hutchinson.212 The Hutchinson court’s overriding policy concern for
the defendant’s rights condoned a relaxation of plain error review
from a “correctability” approach to one focused on the defendant’s
202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037–38 (1980), which all focused on alleged errors in jury instructions). But see id. (citing Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 327, 893 A.2d 1018, 1040 (2006),
which dealt with failure to object to testimony). It has been suggested that the high stakes
of a criminal case justify a more liberal approach to plain error review to ensure that a
defendant’s due process rights are not infringed. Kevin Hessler, Note, State v. Hutchinson, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 362, 370, 382 (1981). The broad application of plain error review—which arguably “comes close to assuring [a defendant] the right to a perfect trial
rather than a fair one”—developed under review of instructional errors to ensure that “no
miscarriage of justice w[ould] be allowed” (no matter how small the error, particularly
when the error concerns an omission from jury instructions). Id. at 382 (arguing that a
more liberal standard might be “too generous,” but is justified to serve the purposes behind the plain error rule). The more liberal approach would then justify intervention
where something was omitted—as opposed to affirmatively stated—in jury instructions.
208. There is some evidence that the court has ruled on improperly preserved issues in
the judicial context. See Pearlstein v. State, 76 Md. App. 507, 516, 547 A.2d 645, 649–50
(1988) (addressing, under the correctability approach, a judge’s making of prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury while trying to assist an underrepresented defendant).
No case, however, appears to apply plain error analysis to such egregious judicial remarks
and conduct of the type that were on display here. See, e.g., Wolfe v. State, 218 Md. 449,
455, 146 A.2d 856, 859 (1958) (addressing under the correctability approach a judge’s
making of prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury while trying to assist an unrepresented defendant); Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 9, 209 A.2d 776, 781 (1965) (noting that “the
unquestionably harmful effects of the judge’s remarks in the presence of the jury . . . would
call for [the court’s] review . . . even if no objection had been made thereto,” but ruling
that an objection had been made here); Ferrell v. State, 73 Md. App. 627, 638–39, 536 A.2d
99, 104–05 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 318 Md. 235, 567 A.2d 937 (1990) (noting that a
judge must not interject herself “into a case to any significant extent,” but concluding that
the remarks did not constitute reversible error). Because the alleged error was so expansive here, the court should have considered the effect that using this more relaxed approach to plain error review would have in the future.
209. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
210. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
211. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
212. 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035.
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substantive rights due to a judge’s omission of certain language from
jury instructions.213 In Diggs, this particular judge’s egregious conduct, which led to a deprivation of the defendants’ due process rights
to a fair trial,214 motivated the court to follow Hutchinson and later
precedent.215 The court, however, failed to consider the effect of the
relaxed due process-centered approach, as opposed to the more narrow “correctability” approach, in the area of judicial conduct. Under
this policy-based inquiry, the court properly applied the recent relaxed plain error precedent216 by examining how the judge’s actual
behavior and appearance to the jury infringed on the defendants’

213. See id. at 203, 411 A.2d at 1038 (relaxing the doctrine by refusing to adopt an
interpretation of the rule that would disallow appellate review where the error, if objected
to, could have been corrected, because it is more important to vindicate a defendant’s
fundamental rights instead of using “such an absolute approach [that] is the antithesis of
the discretion authorized by the rule”); see supra note 207 (discussing the Diggs court’s
reliance on cases like Hutchinson that dealt with plain error review of errors in jury
instructions).
214. Integral to a defendant’s due process right is the right to a decisionmaker who
“listen[s] to arguments of both sides before basing his or her decision on the evidence and
legal rules adduced at the hearing.” 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 968 (1998). In a
jury trial, therefore, the ultimate trier of fact—the jury—must decide the defendant’s guilt
independently of the judge and without actual interference or the appearance of
prejudice.
The appearance of impartiality, therefore, imposes a constellation of concerns involving
judicial conduct. In fact, some scholars consider the “appearance” of fairness to be the
“core” of due process. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483 (1986) (writing that “[f]ew
perceptions more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a
litigant never had a chance”); see also Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 889 (1996) (discussing the “appearance of justice” in
judicial conduct that is necessary in order for the defendant to properly have his due process rights vindicated). Under this heightened concern for appearances, a judge’s egregious conduct interferes substantially with the appearance of justice and would justify the
expansion of plain error review here. See Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 294–95, 973 A.2d
796, 815–16 (2009) (concluding that the jury could have been influenced by the judge’s
behavior). Without this concern for the appearance of justice, but instead emphasizing actual conduct and focusing on a transcript devoid of nonverbal cues and emotions, the
court might not have come to the same conclusion or would have set an easier precedent
to follow. Ultimately, however, the court’s concern for appearances outweighed the failure
to object under the procedural preservation requirement. See id. at 263 & n.2, 973 A.2d at
798 & n.2 (noting that the court decided under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
rather than under the Sixth Amendment, that the defendants’ rights to a fair trial had
been violated). Perhaps the concern with appearances ought not drive the analysis because the appellate court cannot accurately evaluate a judge’s effect on the jury and might
overemphasize or underemphasize his influence.
215. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 294–95, 973 A.2d at 816 (noting that the defendants’ due
process rights to a fair trial had been violated).
216. See id. at 287, 973 A.2d at 811 (applying plain error analysis to review the errors).
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rights, but the court failed to recognize that this context was
different.217
First, the court held that the judge’s words or actions actually adversely influenced the trial.218 In Diggs, for instance, the court found
that during questioning of the prosecution’s lead witness the judge
laid the foundation for the distribution charge,219 rehabilitated another State witness,220 and inappropriately questioned the defense’s
lead witness.221 Similarly, in Ramsey, the court held that the judge elicited key elements of the State’s case from a witness,222 established aspects of a witness’s testimony regarding the drugs,223 elicited
testimony regarding the elements of intent to distribute,224 made
comments to the jurors to bolster the prosecutor’s integrity,225 and
established the drugs’ chain of custody when the prosecutor failed to
do so.226 The court concluded that the judge abused his discretion
and ability to “clarify”227 and acted like a “co-prosecutor.”228
The judge, however, also would have appeared partial to a reasonable person and therefore likely negatively influenced the jury.229
He continually questioned Diggs’s lead witness, “bolster[ing] the
State’s case while implying a disbelief in the defense” and created an
“aura of partiality in front of the jury.”230 Under the relaxed instruc217. The court cited Maryland Rule 8-131(a) for its ability to utilize plain error review,
id. at 283–84 & 284 n.8, 973 A.2d at 809 & n.8, but then relied heavily on jury instruction
cases, like Hutchinson, to construct the plain error standard in the new context, id. at
286–87, 973 A.2d at 811; see supra note 207.
218. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
219. Diggs, 409 Md. at 264, 293, 973 A.2d at 798, 815; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (exploring Diggs’s allegation that the judge laid the foundation for the charge).
220. Diggs, 409 Md. at 265, 293, 973 A.2d at 799, 815; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the judge’s attempt to rehabilitate the witness).
221. Diggs, 409 Md. at 265, 293, 973 A.2d at 799, 815; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining how the judge inappropriately badgered the defense’s lead witness,
Diggs’s sister).
222. Diggs, 409 Md. at 275, 293, 973 A.2d at 805, 815.
223. Id. at 276, 293, 973 A.2d at 805, 815.
224. Id. at 277, 293, 973 A.2d at 806, 815.
225. Id. at 281, 293, 973 A.2d at 808, 815.
226. Id. at 280, 293, 973 A.2d at 807, 815.
227. Id. at 292, 973 A.2d at 814; see also Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 213, 434 A.2d 555,
560 (1981) (holding that the judge must maintain his neutrality, manage his questioning,
and allow attorneys to fulfill clarification concerns through cross-examination).
228. Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815; see also MD. R. 16-813 CJC Canon 3A (stating
that a judge must be impartial).
229. Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815 (holding that the judge’s questioning
showed his disbelief in the witness and created an “aura of partiality” and “an atmosphere
[that was] . . . fundamentally flawed”); see also supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the development of the importance of appearing impartial under Maryland case law).
230. Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815.
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tional error approach, apprehension about the appearance of impartiality, which deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair
trial because of the jury’s perception of a judge’s opinion, was a
proper concern for the court.231 Repeated and badgering questioning would suggest to the jury that the judge did not believe the witness’s testimony;232 the judge’s disbelief, then, would dangerously
impinge on the jury’s role and render a fair trial a nullity.233 Because
of this concern, the court properly held that the judge abused his discretion when his questioning and comments interfered with the “appearance of justice” under the recent relaxed plain error review of
jury instructions.234
b. The Policy Concerns Motivating the Decision to Use the Relaxed
Doctrine Will Have Problematic Effects in the Future
Judicial conduct, as opposed to jury instructions, is more discretion-based.235 As such, the effect of Diggs and the newly-minted “repeated and egregious behavior” exception236 to the preservation rule

231. See Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 205, 772 A.2d 273, 280 (2001) (“[J]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); see also supra note 208 and
accompanying text (discussing how due process concerns justify a more liberal approach
to review of unobjected to instructional errors).
232. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 289–92, 973 A.2d at 813–14 (analyzing how a judge’s repeated
challenges to a witness’s statement could suggest his disbelief in the witness’s testimony
and deprive a defendant of his right to a fair trial); see also Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305,
311, 206 A.2d 250, 254 (1965) (discussing the limits of a judge’s discretion in questioning).
233. Diggs, 409 Md. at 291–92, 973 A.2d at 814.
234. Id. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815; see also Jackson, 364 Md. at 206–07, 772 A.2d at 281–82
(evaluating how the court must prevent the “probability of unfairness” in keeping up the
public perception of the criminal justice system’s ability to render justice (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451–52, 404 A.2d 244, 254
(1979))); cf. Redish & Marshall, supra note 214, at 475–81 (arguing that the “appearance of
justice,” represented by an “independent adjudicator,” is at the “core” of due process).
Ramsey also asserted that the judge demeaned his counsel’s status as a lawyer by stating,
“Just a minute. I did not finish, young lady. You are going to be out of here in a minute.
Don’t interrupt me.” Diggs, 409 Md. at 280, 973 A.2d at 807 (emphasis added). The court,
however, did not explicitly rule on the effect of this comment. See id.
235. Compare Diggs, 409 Md. at 283 n.7, 973 A.2d at 809 n.7 (noting that under Maryland
Rule 4-325, a judge can “‘instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which
the instructions are binding,’” and generally the court is only concerned with whether
“additional language is a correct statement of the law” (citation omitted)), with Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 584–85, 115 A.2d 502, 510–11 (1955) (noting that the judge should be
impartial, but that judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing that the
judge influenced the jury against the defendant).
236. Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
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will implicate a constellation of practical and policy concerns.237
Under the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must observe
“high standards of conduct,”238 but absent a clear showing239 that he
“departed from a neutral judicial role,” his discretion cannot be questioned.240 Making this “clear showing,” however, invites a tedious,
problematic case-by-case inquiry into the record—more so than review of more objective jury instructions.241
Appellate review of a judge’s conduct will require, for instance,
the reviewing court to distinguish between the minutiae—from
proper clarification to improper influencing242—to determine where
the judge appropriately clarified as opposed to where he influenced
the jury.243 Not only is it hard, if not impossible, to quantify the
judge’s effect from a “bare transcript” void of emotions, voice inflections, and “non-verbal cues,”244 but the reviewing court has the benefit of hindsight in the analysis and cannot appreciate courtroom
tensions.245 Setting this precedent based on two egregious cases undermines the fairness and requirements of procedural rules246 and
237. Cf. Hessler, supra note 207, at 377 (suggesting that appellate courts will have to use
their own “subjective evaluation” to determine on a case-by-case basis what constitutes plain
error).
238. MD. R. 16-813 CJC Canon 1.
239. See supra Part II.B.1.a (investigating the “clear showing” standard in Maryland case
law); see also Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 670, 59 A.2d 509, 513 (1948) (explaining that a
“judge should at all times be impartial and courteous and should not permit his personal
feelings . . . to be exhibited before a jury, but unless there is some clear showing . . . that his
words or his actions influenced the jury adversely to the appellant” reversal is not justified).
240. Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 347, 859 A.2d 210, 221 (2004).
241. See Brief of Appellee at 8–9, Ramsey, 409 Md. 260, 973 A.2d 796 (No. 147) (“Without a specific and detailed record of objections to the judge’s questions, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure the effect that the questions may have had on the jury from the
bare transcript . . . .”).
242. See id. at 8–10 (noting that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the effect
that the questions may have had on the jury from the bare transcript”).
243. Compare Apple, 190 Md. at 670, 59 A.2d at 513 (holding that although the trial was
brusquely conducted by the judge, his actions did not clearly influence the jury adversely
to the defendant), with Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 213–14, 434 A.2d 555, 560 (1981)
(holding that while the judge can interrogate witnesses to clarify for the jury, it is better to
leave this task to counsel, and finding that admonitions to the witness infringed on the
defendant’s right to a fair trial).
244. Brief of Appellee, supra note 241, at 8–9.
245. See Dimery v. State, 274 Md. 661, 678–79, 338 A.2d 56, 64–65 (1975) (suggesting
that it is easier for an appellate court “to think and to pick out errors”).
246. See Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150, 729 A.2d 910, 919 (1999) (“The rules for
preservation of issues have a salutary purpose of preventing unfairness and requiring that
all issues be raised in and decided by the trial court, and these rules must be followed in all
cases . . . .”).
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will open appellate review to cases where the result is not so clear.247
Exercising plain error review over a judge’s discretionary conduct will
have the further effects of eroding public confidence in the judge’s
role and of promoting distrust of lower court decisions.248 It may also
have a chilling effect that will temper a judge’s ability to clarify matters
appropriately for the jury and prevent him from fully exercising his
authority.249
c. The Court Could Have Redeemed Its Analysis but Failed to
Consider Trial Tactics in Its Results-Driven, Policy-Based
Decision
The court failed to redeem its analysis when it departed from precedent250 and declined to distinguish the failure to object from trial
tactics.251 Even though this was an exceptional case, guiding the analysis would have better avoided a future influx of appeals based on
247. See Green v. State, 409 Md. 302, 302, 973 A.2d 820, 820 (2009) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of Diggs); see also supra note 24 and accompanying
text. Because the same trial judge decided Green, however, which will likely affect the outcome of that case on remand, Maryland will have to wait for another judge’s conduct to
come up for appeal in order to see how the appellate courts will treat Diggs. See generally
Steve Lash, Double-Murder Conviction At Risk, DAILY REC., June 15, 2009 (noting that Green,
a convicted double-murderer, will have a chance to have his convictions overturned).
248. A relaxed application of plain error review of judicial conduct risks undermining
the trial court’s legitimacy and decisionmaking. See Marla N. Greenstein, Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity and Impartiality of the Courts, JUDGES’ JOURNAL, Spring 2009, at 40,
40 (discussing the argument that the “‘appearance of impropriety’” may lead to the public’s decreased acceptance of court rulings). Reviewing judicial conduct repeatedly on appeal might weaken a judge’s authority to oversee a fair trial and decrease confidence in the
judicial role. See Joseph v. State, No. 1477, 2010 Md. App. LEXIS 16, at *17–21 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Feb. 1, 2010) (holding that “[i]n the event of a retrial in this case, those principles [regarding judicial conduct post-Diggs] should be applied to assure appellant a fair
trial, presided over by a judge who is, and who appears to be, impartial”); see also MD. R. 16813 CJC Canon 1 cmt. (elaborating that deference to the rulings of courts “depends upon
public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges” who must act “without fear
or favor”).
249. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in
the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 536 (2008) (arguing
that strict enforcement of judicial conduct interferes with the judge’s ability to administer
proceedings as it eliminates his or her ability to draw on natural instincts and emotions).
250. See, e.g., Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 588, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992) (holding that
part of the plain error analysis includes “‘giving due regard to whether the error was purely
technical, the product of conscious design or trial tactics or the result of bald inattention’”
(quoting State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202–03, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980))).
251. Ironically, the court included the trial tactics exception when crafting the new
plain error exception, Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 286–87, 973 A.2d 796, 811 (2009), but
failed to delve into any substantive analysis as the dissent did, id. at 297–98, 973 A.2d at 817
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
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judicial conduct.252 The court had the opportunity to explain why
this was not a matter of tactical maneuvers, provoked by Judge Murphy’s dissent, but failed to accept the opportunity.253 The court only
summarily noted that “prosecutors are responsible for developing
their cases, and . . . defense counsel must object in order to seek correction by the judge and preserve the issue for appeal.”254 Addressing
this important piece of precedent, even if the court implicitly ruled
trial tactics out of the analysis, would have given the court some sort of
guideline for the future and strengthened the analysis.255
Moreover, warning counsel that trial tactics will not be countenanced would have encouraged lawyers to act appropriately.256 The
supplementary cautioning would have encouraged counsel to uphold
professional standards257 and avoided abuse of the plain error exception.258 It also would have prevented counsel from believing that he
might be able to double-benefit by playing to the jury’s emotions and
not objecting, knowing that the failure to do so will not be fatal.259
252. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 18, Stuckey v. State, No. 1202 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June
29, 2009) (arguing, under Diggs, that “reversal is required” because counsel’s failure to
repeatedly object “can be explained as an understandable reluctance” to increase courtroom tensions).
253. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 297–98, 973 A.2d at 817 (arguing that Diggs’s counsel failed to
object as a matter of trial tactics).
254. Id. at 294, 973 A.2d at 816 (majority opinion).
255. See Dimery v. State, 274 Md. 661, 677–79, 338 A.2d 56, 64–65 (1975) (holding that
there was no plain error where counsel did not request jury instructions as to the jury’s
right to limit the period of incarceration because “[i]t might well have been a matter of
trial tactics”).
256. Compare MURPHY, supra note 202, § 111 (writing that counsel must object to the
judge’s conduct), with Johnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 388–89, 722 A.2d 873, 880 (1999)
(noting that judges get angry and irritated, but possess the power to punish, and thus have
a duty to control themselves despite counsel’s behavior).
257. See generally Hessler, supra note 207, at 382 (suggesting that the court’s holding in
Hutchinson, which similarly relaxed the plain error doctrine, would “foster less competent
practice in the legal profession”).
258. See id. at 381 (suggesting that expansion of the rule might lead to exceptions “swallow[ing] the rule” and “beginning . . . a trend toward plain error review of progressively
less harmful mistakes than those deemed reviewable in the past”).
259. See State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 218, 411 A.2d 1035, 1046 (1980) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]n attorney might very well sit quietly by when an obvious error of this kind
arises saying to himself that if the jury in its wisdom does not acquit his client, then he has
in the record a ground for appellate reversal.”); see also Dimery, 274 Md. at 679, 338 A.2d at
65 (holding that plain error does not include counsel’s mistakes). Some think that the
substantial rights portion of the plain error analysis has led to an ad hoc, case-by-case inquiry. See generally Jeffrey L. Lowry, Note, Plain Error Rule—Clarifying Plain Error Analysis
Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065,
1083 (1994) (discussing the ad hoc application of the federal plain error counterpart).
Others argue, however, that the court’s discretionary use of plain error review may prove to
be its best defense against counsel’s use of “trial tactics” because he will think twice, uncertain about whether the appellate court will review the unpreserved error. See Hessler, supra
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Alternatives Existed to Reach Judicial Integrity with Less Problematic
Consequences

The Court of Appeals likely avoided separating Diggs and Ramsey
because the same judge decided both cases and exhibited a pattern of
egregious conduct.260 This decision, however, required the court to
expand plain error review to justify overturning the convictions in
both cases. Perhaps the court could have reversed the judgment in
Diggs, based on the properly preserved exchange between the judge
and Diggs’s lead witness,261 and found partiality without considering
the judge’s interchange with the other witnesses that were not properly preserved.262 With regard to Ramsey, the court could have reversed solely on the properly preserved issue of the judge’s remarks to
the jury263 without expanding the analysis to a host of other issues
under plain error review.264 Even if the court did not find that the
alleged error of judicial remarks in Ramsey was as convincing as the
continuous questioning beyond clarification in Diggs, the court could
have separated the cases instead of consolidating them and expanding
the use of plain error review.265 In the interest of keeping the cases
consolidated, addressing the entirety of the judge’s repeated and
egregious behavior, and sending a disciplinary message, the court had
to use a broader analysis of the entire record and subsequently left
imprecise guidelines in the process. Instead of the course it took, the
court could have better addressed the same concerns under its supervisory authority, without the use of plain error review to reverse both
note 207, at 383 (suggesting that the use of plain error as a defense strategy should not be
overemphasized precisely because the uncertainty of its application makes it unreliable).
260. The court consolidated the cases instead of separating and making distinctions between them. See Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 294–95, 973 A.2d 796, 816 (2009) (deciding
both cases together).
261. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
262. The court could have done this simply by deciding the two cases separately instead
of together. See generally Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815 (finding that the judge’s
conduct precluded Diggs from having a fair trial and then separately examining the judge’s
conduct in Ramsey’s case).
263. See id. at 285, 973 A.2d at 810 (noting that “the defense objected after the judge
remarked to the jury that ‘most lawyers, good lawyers, talk to their witnesses,’” and while
the judge did not rule on the objection he instead commented to the jury about the appropriateness of the prosecutor’s conduct).
264. See supra notes 12–23 and accompanying text (exploring the judge’s conduct in
both Diggs and Ramsey).
265. See generally Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of
Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be—Part I Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and
Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 723 (1995) (discussing the drawbacks of consolidation,
including “lessen[ing the] courts’ ability to modify litigants’ decisions defining the boundaries of lawsuits, to create the most efficient litigation units, and to manage litigation most
productively and fairly”).
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convictions,266 or ruled on the properly preserved issues, separately in
Diggs and Ramsey, and sought assistance from the Commission on Judicial Disabilities to discipline the judge.267
1. The Court Could Have Relied on Its Supervisory Authority to
Avoid Creating a “Repeated and Egregious Behavior”
Exception to Plain Error Review
The court could have exercised its “inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice”268 to examine and rule on the
judge’s impartiality, guided by the Code of Judicial Conduct.269 Even
though technically counsel’s failure to object might not prove fatal in
this scenario either, the court’s concern for the particular circumstances of these cases—both decided by the same judge—would have
justified exercising this exceptional review over both cases.270 Doing
so would have sent a stronger message that ordinarily an appellate
court will not exercise its supervisory authority to review an erroneous
judge where errors have not been preserved and will only exercise
such authority in truly exceptional cases.271
Precedent existed under Archer v. State,272 in which the court held
that “as a matter of Maryland nonconstitutional criminal procedure,
the trial judge’s improper use of judicial authority” compelled reversal
and remand for a new trial.273 The Diggs court relied on this holding,274 but ultimately decided the case based on the defendants’ due
process rights.275 If the court would have taken this alternative approach and exercised its “inherent supervisory authority,”276 the ex266. See infra Part IV.B.1.
267. See infra Part IV.B.2.
268. Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 360, 859 A.2d 210, 229 (2004).
269. See, e.g., MD. R. 16-813 CJC Canons 2–3 (describing the standards of judicial conduct for avoiding impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and for performance of
judicial duties).
270. See generally Archer, 383 Md. at 360, 859 A.2d at 229 (asserting the court’s “inherent
supervisory authority over the administration of justice in Maryland courts”); Weinschel v.
Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 259, 466 A.2d 1301, 1304 (1983) (noting that the Court of Appeals has the ability to exercise supervisory authority).
271. This type of review is so rare, in fact, that the Court of Appeals claimed that it
exercised its supervisory authority for the first time in Archer, decided in 2004. State v.
Manck, 385 Md. 581, 606 n.3, 870 A.2d 196, 211 n.3 (2005).
272. 383 Md. 329, 859 A.2d 210.
273. Id. at 360, 859 A.2d at 229.
274. Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 287, 973 A.2d 796, 811 (2009).
275. See id. at 263 & n.2, 973 A.2d at 798 & n.2 (noting that Ramsey’s second question
for appeal—whether his Sixth Amendment right was violated—did not need to be decided
“because of the . . . disposition of his first question,” which was the violation of his rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
276. Archer, 383 Md. at 360, 859 A.2d at 229.
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pansion of plain error analysis arguably could have been avoided.277
The court could have reversed solely because the judge’s conduct was
inappropriate without examining counsel’s failure to object.278 The
slight alteration of the framework spearheading the analysis would
have allowed the court to avoid specifically addressing the failure to
object and instead to focus on the key issue of judicial conduct.
The shifted framework would have avoided two problematic issues. First, conceptualizing the problem as one of supervisory authority over the “administration of justice” would have placed the
emphasis on the appropriate scope of judicial discretion under the
Code of Judicial Conduct to restore judicial integrity.279 Under the
plain error analysis, however, the court had to first explore counsel’s
failure to object280 and then examine whether the judge’s behavior
was so egregious as to justify review under this plain error standard.281
The alternate approach would have avoided justifying counsel’s failure to object, and instead highlighted the appellate court’s ability to
ensure “justice” in every case.282 Being forthright about the extreme
and continual behavior in these cases under an inherent, truly exceptional type of appellate review, would have more strongly reminded
judges of their duty to maintain impartiality and high standards of
conduct. The candid focus would have been appropriately centered
on the judge, rather than on both the judge and counsel, to justify
counsel’s failure to object and invoke plain error review.283 If the
court acknowledged that it did not want to separate the cases because
277. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 177, at 18 (arguing that the court could have
instead utilized its supervisory authority in reviewing the judge’s conduct). The rarity of
the invocation of its supervisory authority would have supported the conclusion that the
court will seldom overturn a case for reasons of judicial conduct. Other states, particularly
Connecticut, note that an appellate court’s supervisory authority is to be exercised rarely.
See Smith v. Andrews, 959 A.2d 597, 610 (Conn. 2008) (noting that the court’s supervisory
authority is only very rarely invoked); Sapper v. Sapper, 951 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Conn. App. Ct.
2008) (invoking appellate review under the court’s “inherent supervisory authority” to review claims of prejudicial judicial conduct where plain error review was not properly
requested).
278. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 293–95, 973 A.2d at 815–16 (addressing counsels’ failures to
object to the judge’s conduct).
279. See generally MD. R. 16-813 pmbl. (noting that judges must “honor and respect the
judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain public confidence in
our legal system”).
280. Diggs, 409 Md. at 284–85, 973 A.2d at 809–10.
281. Id. at 287, 973 A.2d at 811.
282. See Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 360, 859 A.2d 210, 229 (2004) (noting the court’s
ability to reverse the trial court’s judgment as a matter of Maryland nonconstitutional criminal procedure).
283. See Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 106–07, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993) (relying on
the Code of Judicial Conduct to find that the judge appeared to be partial). Here, the
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the same judge heard both, it could have used this alternate approach
to reach the same conclusion and better protect judicial integrity.284
Moreover, practitioners would no longer have precedent to justify
their failures to object while seeking appellate review in every case,
only rare, exceptional cases.285
Second, invoking the court’s supervisory power under Archer
would have avoided utilizing the relaxed plain error doctrine in contexts other than judicial conduct, such as review of evidentiary issues.286 Approving of the exception in the discretionary arena of
judicial conduct—and perhaps other areas in the future—could undermine a system of procedure meant to protect fairness to all parties
and could infringe on the authority of lower courts.287 The court
should have better defended the preservation rule and highlighted its
important function in the administration of justice.288 Using its supervisory power would have allowed the court to address the judge’s conduct and the defendants’ due process rights, while avoiding the
expansion of plain error review and fortifying easily administrable,
procedural fairness rules.289
court could have similarly ruled under the Code of Judicial Conduct to tie its inquiry to
rules and reinforce the importance of the judge’s conduct.
284. Because exercising its supervisory authority is a rarity, this course would have highlighted the egregiousness of the judge’s continual behavior in these particular cases and
signaled to counsel, in a more substantial way, that future cases will not be granted certiorari when counsel fails to object. See State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 606 n.3, 870 A.2d 196,
211 n.3 (2005) (noting that Archer was the first time the court had exercised an inherent
supervisory power).
285. See Diggs, 409 Md. at 294, 973 A.2d at 816 (attempting to narrow the plain error
analysis by stating that “[f]ailure to object in less persuasive situations may not have the
same result, nor will we necessarily intervene”).
286. See Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150–51, 729 A.2d 910, 919–20 (1999) (discussing
the court’s treatment of alleged unpreserved evidence errors under Maryland Rule 4323(a), which does not include a “plain error” exception as Maryland Rule 4-325(e) provides for jury instructions); see also supra notes 38, 73 (giving fuller explanations and case
citations that expand upon this distinction).
287. See Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, Butler v. State: Upholding the Right to a Fair Trial at All
Costs, 66 MD. L. REV. 1098, 1119–20 (2007) (suggesting that granting the trial judge deference improves judicial efficiency and restores confidence “that [the trial judge’s] decisions
will not always be second-guessed”).
288. See Carter, supra note 28, at 950 (suggesting that the preservation rule gives the trial
court primacy over a case, affords an appellate court a full record, encourages the proper
behavior of attorneys, and recognizes the unfairness to the winning party at trial).
289. Cf. John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party
Autonomy in an Adversary System, 80 NEB. L. REV. 159, 161 (2001) (arguing that requiring
counsel to object “as soon as an impending violation of the rule is reasonably to be anticipated” is a procedural avenue through which the adversarial system places the burden on
the parties to depict the facts accurately and promotes a fair process); Richard E. Langlois,
Preservation of Error 1 (Apr. 29–May 1, 2009) (unpublished paper, prepared for Conference for Criminal Appeals sponsored by University of Texas School of Law), available at
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The Court Could Have Increased Judicial Integrity by Leaving the
Matter of Judicial Discipline up to the Commission on
Judicial Disabilities Instead of Creating Vague Precedent

Instead of creating questionable precedent by combining the
cases to discipline the judge, the court could have utilized the Commission on Judicial Disabilities to restore public confidence.290 The
court could have ruled separately on the properly preserved errors in
Diggs and Ramsey, and then left the Commission with the task of disciplining the judge.291 The Commission then could have issued a private reprimand292 or entered into a deferred discipline agreement
with the judge without proceedings,293 filed charges,294 disciplined
him by consent before rendering a decision,295 or issued a public reprimand or referred the matter to the Court of Appeals upon clear and
convincing evidence that the judge had committed sanctionable
conduct.296
The judge’s egregious conduct here seemingly violated provisions
of the Code of Judicial Conduct when the court found that his conduct showed his partiality and “created [an] aura of partiality in front
of the jury.”297 His badgering of defense witnesses beyond mere clarification in Diggs and his establishing key aspects of the State’s case in
Ramsey, among other alleged errors, manifested bias appropriate for
http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=20627 (suggesting that the preservation requirement ensures that attorneys are knowledgeable about trial rules).
290. See Note, Discipline of Judges in Maryland, 34 MD. L. REV. 612, 615–19 (1974), for a
helpful background discussion on the Commission on Judicial Disabilities.
291. See MD. R. 16-805 (defining the Commission’s ability to investigate complaints).
292. MD. R. 16-807(b).
293. MD. R. 16-807(c). If the Commission concludes that the “conduct was not so serious, offensive, or repeated as to warrant formal proceedings,” but that the judge should
“undergo specific treatment, participate in one or more specified educational programs,
issue an apology . . . or take other specific corrective or remedial action” and the judge
agrees while also meeting a few other specifications, he may enter a deferred discipline
agreement. Id.
294. MD. R. 16-808(a).
295. MD. R. 16-808(l). After charges are filed, but before the Commission’s decision,
the following may occur:
[T]he judge and Investigative Counsel may enter into an agreement in which the
judge (1) admits to all or part of the charges; (2) as to the charges admitted,
admits the truth of all facts constituting sanctionable conduct as set forth in the
agreement; (3) agrees to take any corrective or remedial action provided for in
the agreement; (4) consents to the stated sanction; (5) states that the consent is
freely and voluntarily given; and (6) waives the right to further proceedings
before the Commission and subsequent proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
Id.
296. MD. R. 16-808(j).
297. Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 293, 973 A.2d 796, 815 (2009).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR305.txt

2010]

unknown

DIGGS V. STATE

Seq: 38

28-MAY-10

13:44

717

review by the Commission as well as disciplinary action.298 Although
the judge in Diggs did not use vulgar profanity like sanctioned judges
in the past, he appears to have violated obligatory provisions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct,299 making his actions sanctionable by the
Commission or the Court of Appeals.300 The court, thereby, would
have avoided expanding plain error analysis as a vehicle through
which it could discipline a seemingly errant judge,301 while properly

298. See supra text accompanying notes 156–60 (discussing the judge’s behavior in Diggs
and Ramsey); see also In re Lamdin, 404 Md. 631, 652, 948 A.2d 54, 66 (2008) (noting that
that judge’s improper behavior “undermined the judicial system repeatedly”); In re Foster,
271 Md. 449, 478, 318 A.2d 523, 538 (1974) (accepting the Commission on Judicial Disabilities’s recommendation that Judge Foster be censured for violating judicial conduct rules).
See generally MD. R. 16-813 CJC Canon 3A cmt. (providing that “[f]acial expression and
body language, in addition to oral communication, can give an appearance of judicial
bias”).
299. While the Court of Appeals did not evaluate the judge’s conduct in light of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, his behavior appears to have violated the obligatory provisions.
See Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815 (noting the judge’s conduct “crossed the line of
propriety” and “created [an] aura of partiality in front of the jury”). Not only was the
judge’s behavior at issue in these two cases, but the behavior was repeated on many occasions. See, e.g., Green v. State, 409 Md. 302, 302, 973 A.2d 820, 820 (2009) (vacating and
remanding another case of the judge in Diggs). Recent appeals have been raised over the
same judge’s conduct in other cases. See Appellant’s Brief at 7–18, Joseph v. State, No.
1477 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (claiming that defendant was not given a fair trial
because the judge interjected and assisted the prosecution through interjecting inappropriate questions and comments); Appellant’s Brief at 24–31, Sims v. State, No. 1509 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (claiming that the defendant is entitled to a new trial because the judge acted as a co-prosecutor); Brief of Appellant at 16–28, Haggerty v. State,
No. 1009 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 1, 2009) (alleging that the judge acted as an inquisitor
and second prosecutor).
300. Compare Diggs, 409 Md. at 293, 973 A.2d at 815 (noting that in Diggs, the judge’s
behavior and comments “bolstered the State’s case while implying a disbelief in the defense and created the aura of partiality in front of the jury,” and in Ramsey, the judge
“bolster[ed] the integrity of the prosecutor,” “elicited key elements of the State’s case,” and
“established key aspects of [the State’s witness’s] testimony”), with In re Lamdin, 404 Md. at
652, 948 A.2d at 66 (sanctioning the judge for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
because his comments “undermined the judicial system repeatedly”).
301. Of course, the problem with judicial commissions may be a lack of transparency.
See Green & Roiphe, supra note 249, at 550 n.263 (noting that judicial commissions are
usually not public, which may undermine their ability to dispense justice). While the Commission’s investigation might prevent future prejudicial or inappropriate behavior, its
drawback is that, despite posting opinions on an Internet website, the public receives no
actual notice of the proceedings, which places doubt on the assumption that public confidence in the judiciary is actually reinforced. See id. (suggesting that the lack of transparency in the process undermines the hope that commissions will instill a sense of
confidence in the judiciary). In this sense, the disconnect between the actions of judicial
commissions and public awareness of their procedures might undermine the “appearance
of justice,” see supra note 214 (probing scholars’ work that suggests the appearance of justice might be the core of due process), but reach actual justice by sanctioning a judge for
his prejudicial behavior.
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addressing the defendants’ due process rights and upholding the procedural rules.302
V.

CONCLUSION

In Diggs v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals, using a plain
error analysis when counsel failed to object to much of the judge’s
behavior, reversed two drug convictions because the error complained
of was so material to the rights of the accused as to preclude a fair
trial.303 Instead of creating a “repeated and egregious behavior” exception to the preservation rule,304 the court could have set more narrow precedent under the older “correctability” standard,305 which
would not have expanded the use of plain error review to a new context and left vague guidelines for the future.306 The court could have
used better alternatives to address the underlying integrity concerns,
rather than creating problematic precedent.307

Some state judicial commissions have rules that require records and proceedings to be
kept confidential, at least for a certain period of time. Jeffrey M. Sharman, Senior Fellow
American Judicature Society, Judicial Ethics: Independence, Impartiality, and Integrity 11
(May 19–22, 1996) (unpublished paper, prepared for Inter-American Development Bank
Judicial Reform Roundtable II). This procedure protects unwarranted complaints against
judges, but the confidentiality thwarts transparency efforts. Id.; see also Nuno Garoupa &
Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 103, 119 (2009) (“[T]he key factor [for success] is effective calibration between
judicial independence and external accountability.”). States that limit confidentiality protections and allow public access to records and proceedings once an initial investigation
has been undertaken strike the best balance. Sharman, supra, at 11; cf. Kathy Mack &
Sharyn Roach Anleu, The Security of Tenure of Australian Magistrates, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 370,
396–97 (2006) (arguing, specifically in the context of Australian judicial commissions, that
the “transparency and procedural fairness” of the Judicial Commission in Australia “provides significant protection for the constitutional values of public confidence and institutional integrity”).
302. Cf. Hon. Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., The Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities:
Whither Thou Goest?, U. BALT. L.F., Spring 1996, at 3, 10 (noting that one of the Commission’s main purposes “is to maintain the public’s confidence in the judiciary” (citing Frank
Greenberg, The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 458, 462 (1976))). The Circuit
Administrative Judge or Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals could also have exercised
supervisory authority. MD. R. 16-101. See generally 7 M.L.E. Courts § 3 (2000) (providing
that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals has administrative responsibility over all of
the courts of the State and can appoint a Circuit Administrative Judge to supervise fellow
judges and implement policies of the Court of Appeals).
303. Diggs, 409 Md. at 293–95, 973 A.2d at 815–16.
304. Id.
305. See supra Part IV.A.1.
306. See supra Part IV.A.2.
307. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.

